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1. Problems to be Tackled
1.1 Objectives
Many studies suggest that high performance 
work systems are well diffused in European countries 
as well as in the U.S., and that the systems 
contribute considerably to the promotion of 
productivity (Osterman [1994], Hamilton, Nickerson 
and Owan [2003], Black and Lynch [2004], Blooms 
and Reenen [2007], Ichniovski, Shaw, and Prenusi 
[1997], Jones and Kato [2010], Kato and Owan 
[2011]). Yet only a few works have probed their 
historical origins, and even most of those studies 
examine only recent decades (Kato and Morishima 
[2003]). If the origin might be observed in an earlier 
period, then this could contribute much to our 
understanding of the path through which these 
systems have evolved. By investigating two Japanese 
cases in the 1920s and 1930s, this paper aims to 
elucidate the historical origins of the systems.
As an additional motivation, this paper casts 
serious doubt on the majority view in contemporary 
Japan that insists that Japan’s work system lacks 
any effective incentives, due to seniority-based 
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wages (Abegglen [1969] p.113). This is really 
curious, given that Western scholars tend to think 
that Japan has been one of the frontrunners in the 
field of worker involvement (Ichniowski and Shaw 
[2003]).
1.2 Two cases
Here we analyze only two cases, cotton 
spinning works and a trade union in the rope and 
cable manufacturing industry belonging to Sōdōmei 
(General Federation of Trade Unions). The former, 
cotton spinning, was indeed the largest sector of 
Japanese industry in the 1920s and 1930s, 
accounting for nearly half of the manufacturing 
industries in terms of the number of employees, and 
fully half of overall exports. Moreover, in the early 
1930s this sector surpassed the UK cotton spinning 
industry, which had dominated international markets 
for a century. Therefore, we have every reason to 
investigate this crucial sector.
The rope and cable union belonged to a 
national center of trade unions that lasted for the 
longest period before World War II. Among Sōdōmei 
unions, we focus on a trade union at the enterprise 
level with a membership of around 2,000. Labor 
historians in Japan have often looked down up this 
small national center because of its non-left wing 
unionism. Yet, This rope and cable union clearly 
was not merely a subservient company union. First, 
nearly a quarter of the dues collected from union 
members were used to subscribe yearly to the 
national center. Second, the top representative of 
the union leaders at the enterprise-level had never 
been an employee of the firm, but was a professional 
union officer of Sōdōmei. 
One may ask if trade unions in Japan of the 
1920s and 1930s were too small to function in an 
industrial society, since the rate of unionization was 
as low as 8% in 1931. Yet 8% is almost half of the 
union participation ratio in contemporary Japan 
(and well over half of that of the US), so we cannot 
neglect the trade unions of the time.
1.3 Constraints
A historical study can often cover only some 
of the crucial variables relating to an issue in focus, 
due to limited data availability. In this study, the 
relevant issue is high performance work systems. 
According to many excellent studies, the most 
crucial variables are the following three: workers’ 
voice, which may take various forms, such as formal 
trade unions or joint consultation plans; the 
technical skills of workers, which are usually difficult 
to measure; and effective incentive systems to 
encourage workers to contribute their own ideas to 
enhance productivity (Osterman [1994], Ichniowski 
et al. [1997], Kato and Morishima [2002], Black and 
Lynch [2004], Kato and Owan [2011]). 
For the first case of cotton spinning, we only 
have data on the incentive system, whereas direct 
data on the skills and voice of workers are not 
available. Yet an analysis of the incentive system 
suggests that there were indeed some incentives for 
skill development for workers. Moreover, the surge 
in Japan’s share of the international market in the 
1920s and 30s, compared particularly with the UK, 
seems consistent with my contention that skills 
upgrading contributed to the remarkable growth in 
the productivity of the Japanese cotton spinning 
industry. The second case of the rope and cable 
trade union offers empirical data on the integration 
of workers’ voice, which is documented in the 
collective bargaining records. Moreover, 
quantitative data is available that provides vivid 
examples of improvements in productivity as a 
result of ideas contributed by union members. In the 
following section, we will investigate the case of 
cotton spinning. The third section discusses the 
case of the rope and cable trade union. In the final 
section, we discuss the implications of these case 
studies for the existing literature on high 
performance work systems.  
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2. Cotton Spinning Industry
2.1 Short periods of work experience?
Some may question the reason for taking the 
cotton spinning as a case study for high performance 
work systems in Japan. First of all, workers’ skills 
were minimal, given that the core workforce in the 
largest cotton spinning companies is believed to be 
comprised primarily of young girls whose service or 
experience was naturally too short to allow for skills 
development. In fact, the ratio of female workers 
was as high as 85% even in the ten largest firms in 
this industry. This is higher than in the UK, which 
had slightly more than 50% women, and far more 
than in the US and India, where female workers were 
a small minority. If we take the final spinning 
process, one of the most important departments, 
then almost all operatives on the production line 
were female, with a few men mostly working 
maintenance jobs. 
The lowest supervisors (called mimawari kō, a 
literal translation of overlookers in English) were 
largely female veteran workers in the department. 
According to a laborious study on Fujibō, one of the 
ten largest companies, male overlookers in 1911 
numbered 31 in one factory with many departments, 
while female overlookers numbered 41 (Kaneko 
[2009] p.79). Considering that there were few 
workshops composed of male workers, and that men 
were mainly engaged in maintenance and handling 
heavy materials, it was natural that most of the 
overlookers would be female in departments 
occupied mostly by female workers. Therefore, we 
focus on female workers as the core workforce of 
the industry in those days. Our analysis begins by 
examining the length of their service and experience 
in the 1920s and 1930s.
Fortunately, high quality statistics on the 
length of service and experience are available for 
the cotton spinning industry for the year 1927. This 
was conducted by Japanese government central 
placement agency, with a large coverage of nearly 
10% of all cotton spinning workers, collecting 
responses from 21,852 female workers in 34 factories 
across Japan. In particular, the detailed questions in 
the survey allow us to distinguish clearly between 
the length of service and ‘experience in the same 
industry.’ This is extremely valuable, given that few 
contemporary statistical surveys of this large scale 
ask about these two distinct human capital variables.
In addition, an in-depth case study by Kaneko 
[2009] compiled previously undisclosed internal 
documents from Fujibō.  His study provides detailed 
statistics on the length of service for the year 1921. 
This is precious data because the length of service 
is disaggregated into ‘commuting female workers’ 
and ‘dormitory residents,’ which was a crucial 
distinction affecting the length of service. Although 
we have more comprehensive government statistics 
for the 1920s and 30s, a crucial defect lies in the 
key category employed in the statistics, making it 
too vague to identify whether data refers to the 
length of service (tenure/years of employment with 
the same firm) or work experience in the same 
industry.
Based on the aforementioned, high quality 
sources, Table 1 clearly indicates that, first, many 
female workers had a service of three years or longer, 
and that some even had over five years’ experience. 
Those with three or more years of service constituted 
nearly a quarter of the workforce, and when those 
with three or more years of experience in the cotton 
spinning industry are taken, the share amounts to 
37%. Industry experience is thought to be a better 
indicator of the level of workers’ skills than length of 
service within one firm because the skills presumably 
were hardly firm specific, as attested by the many 
anecdotes of worker raiding in the industry at the 
time. Even those with five or more years of experience 
comprised more than one-sixth of the workforce. 
Furthermore, we must note the remarkable fact that 
even supervisors at the lowest level were 
overwhelmingly female, overseeing workshops 
mostly composed of female operatives.
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Why do we focus on workers with three to five 
or more years of experience? We intend to utilize 
the major findings deduced from one of the most in-
depth field surveys of workers’ skills in contemporary 
Japan (Koike, Chuma, &  Ōta [2001]). Koike et al. 
[2001] insist that the most crucial skill in promoting 
productivity is the ability to deal with problems that 
occur unpredictably but nonetheless relatively 
frequently. Despite the distance between the two 
time periods in question, we believe it possible to 
apply these findings retroactively to assess the 
situation of the early twentieth-century. The core 
hypothesis is that many workers with three or more 
years of experience will be able to deal with small-
scale problems on the shop floor, if provided with 
the opportunity to develop the skills to handle 
them. Those with experience of five or more years 
will be able to understand the root causes of the 
problems to some extent. A further explanation of 
workers skills and skill development will be provided 
later in our discussion of the reasons for the large 
increase in base pay. 
Undoubtedly, the most vital factor affecting 
the length of service was the growing number of 
commuting workers who did not live in company 
dormitories. Fortunately, a large-scale survey by 
the cotton spinning employers’ association is 
available for the year 1926, and it reveals that 
commuting workers were 25% of female workers and 
79% of male (Chimoto [1999]). Why did the number 
of commuting female workers increase from a few? 
The major reason lies in management policy. 
Worried about the rising cost of recruitment due to 
remarkably expanding demands for labor, 
management encouraged female incumbents to stay 
longer. In particular, they developed policies that 
encouraged female workers to get married, offered 
company housing for continuing years of service, 
and in some cases even provided money for the care 
of the children of female workers.
Conversely, the prevailing opinions have 
heavily emphasized the importance of low wages and 
the effect of standardization in the production 
process in reducing skill requirements. They look 
only at the average years of service and neglect the 
growing group of workers with a longer service 
record. Thus, they suggest that the main reason 
why the Japanese cotton spinning industry surpassed 
that of the UK was simply the low wages in Japan 
(Takamura [1971] I ,p. 338). Yet, if low wages were 
the main reason, then India or China would have 
surpassed the UK, since both countries had wages 
lower than Japan’s. In particular, India started 
large-scale cotton spinning factories more than a 
decade before Japan, yet it increasingly fell behind 
Japan.
2.2 A Large Increase in the Base Salary Profiles
In analyzing the incentives offered to workers, 
Table 1  Length of Service and Experience of Female Workers in Cotton Spinning Industry
 ―Percentage distribution of workers (%)
Central Placement 
Agency, 1927
Kaneko Survey, 
1921
Length of service
Length of 
experience in the 
same industry
Length of service
Commuters Dormitory Total
Total 100 100 100 100 100
3 years and longer 23.8 36.8 49.5 17.6 27.8
5 years and longer 8.8 15.7 33.3 6.4 14.3
10 years and longer 1.4 2.2 8.8 0.7 3.3
Source:
a. Central Placement Agency: Chuo Shokugyo Shokai Jimukyoku (Central Placement Agency) 1929
b. Kaneko Survey: Kaneko. 2009: 72.
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it is best to concentrate on the final spinning 
department, where female workers and female 
supervisors were predominant. Payment based on 
group performance was common in most cotton 
spinning firms, in particular for this department. 
The size of the unit constituting a group for the 
purposes of group pay is unclear-it is likely that 
those who were under one supervisor, consisting of 
two to three dozen workers, made one unit or 
group. The aggregate amount given in the form of 
group pay depended on output measures, considering 
the count of yarn produced. Additional parameters 
considered in the group pay formula were climate 
(particularly the level of humidity), and the condition 
of the spinning machines. When humidity was low, 
yarn cuts occurred more frequently, causing output 
to fall. When a machine had more trouble than 
usual, naturally output decreased. These factors 
were taken into account by an adjustment coefficient 
of perhaps 15% (Kaneko [2009] p.122). This suggests 
that the pay system was elaborately designed even 
back then.
More important is the way in which this 
aggregate sum for a group was allocated to each 
individual. The individual’s base pay played the 
decisive role. The aggregate sum was divided in 
proportion to each individual base pay. Even more 
important was that the individual’s base pay 
increased with almost regular increments, subject to 
performance evaluation. Table 2 shows the wage 
table of Fujibō, for the year 1907. Clearly there was 
not a single uniform pay rate for a job category, but 
rather, was basically a range rate under “pay-for-
job grade” plans with performance evaluation.1)  
This is different from the standard blue-collar 
payment system in the West, and resembles 
somewhat the white-collar pay system in the West 
and Japan, which we discuss in the final section.
The ‘new hire’ pay grade was applied only for 
a probationary period, usually for as short as a few 
months. Once promoted to ‘regular worker’, 
employees were placed at Pay Grade 1, Step 1, 
which led to a day wage rate of 18 sen (cents). For 
the initial period, everyone could be promoted 
regularly every two months within Pay Grade 1; in 
other words, during the first year no evaluations 
took place. For Pay Grades 2 and 3, only half of the 
workers would be promoted, in light of attendance 
records and performance evaluations. Promotion to 
Pay Grade 4 and the upper-level steps depended 
heavily on performance evaluation. In addition to 
the subjective performance evaluations of female 
blue-collar workers, another remarkable feature 
was the large increase in their base pay. If we take 
Step 1 of Grade 1 as the base, then the highest rate 
of pay for Grade 4 was as much as two and a half 
times more. Even if a worker stopped at Grade 3, 
the increase over base pay was almost 180% of Step 
1, Grade 1.
A plausible hypothesis is that this large 
increase reflected to some extent the skill 
development of workers, which management sought 
to encourage. Though evidence is insufficient to 
describe the particular skill development, it is 
Table 2  Base Pay for Female Workers  1907, Fujibō
(sen)
Job grade 　 Step 　 　 　 　 　
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step  5 Step 6 Step 7
New hire 14 15 16 17 　 　 　
Grade 1 18 19 20 21 22 23
Grade 2 24 25 26 27
Grade 3 28 30 32
Grade 4 34 36 38 40 42 44 46
Source:  Kaneko. 2009: 113
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difficult to find other hypotheses equally consistent 
with this pay policy. For example, the traditional 
hypothesis emphasizing the low level of Japanese 
wages might suggest that companies were forced to 
increase pay to account for growing costs of living, 
neglecting the issue of skill development, but this 
argument is less appealing, given that the workers 
were mostly young women. A relevant comparison, 
however, is provided by the profile of Japanese 
carpenters’ pay in the 18th and 19th century, since 
this was a typical skilled occupation for male 
breadwinners supporting their families, so that 
individual pay would need to increase as they 
became older, according to Japanese traditional 
theory. In fact, individual pay hardly increased once 
carpenters became journeymen (Koike [2012] 
pp.142-145). Similarly, skilled mechanics in one of 
the largest shipbuilding yards in late 19th century 
Japan were paid almost a flat rate, with little 
increases in base pay after finishing their training 
years. This is confirmed in an in-depth study of 
individual pay throughout a worker’s career during 
the 1870s-80s (Nakanishi [1983]  pp.648-659). 
These wage profiles share similarities with those of 
craftsmen, or mechanics, in the late 19th century in 
the UK (Bowley and Wood [1906] p.154; Koike 
[2012] pp.134-136). Therefore, traditional Japanese 
theories are ill suited to explain the features of the 
cotton spinning industry discussed above.
Another noteworthy fact is the size of the 
increase in base pay for female workers at the 
beginning of the 20th century in the Japanese cotton 
spinning industry: the increase in base pay profiles 
was far larger than that of semi-skilled British 
workers of the late 19th century, which was only 
30-35% (Bowley and Wood [1906] p.154).
As for the deferred payment theory of wages 
that encourages workers to stay longer, this seems 
insufficient to explain such a large increase in base 
pay, unless we take into account of significant skill 
development.
In short, if we do not make an assumption that 
employers placed value on workers’ skills, it is 
difficult to explain the wage profiles of Japanese 
female workers of cotton spinning industry in this 
period.
2.3 Female Workers’ Skills
In light of the limited but valuable available 
information provided above, it becomes essential to 
discuss what valuable skills female workers acquired 
during their service at that early period of the 
Japanese cotton industry: in particular, workers’ 
skills to deal with problems arising in the production 
process. What kinds of problems occurred? What 
problems were not necessarily explained in manuals, 
or in other words, not handled by simple routine 
operations? Dealing with problems requires non-
routine operations, such as detecting defects and 
even reasoning about their causes. To give an 
example, one of the crucial defects in the quality of 
yarn produced was unevenness, which caused much 
trouble at the subsequent stage of weaving. This 
was emphasized in many circulars written in 1907-
08 by Mutō Sanji, the distinguished leader of 
Kanebō, one of the three biggest cotton spinning 
companies (Kuwabara [1996]). This factor is also 
specified by the contemporary official standards of 
quality for cotton products, such as JIS (Japan 
Industrial Standards).
According to a study by a veteran engineer 
(Kamimae [1970]), the major reasons for unevenness 
in yarn were unskillful tying by operators and trouble 
in the spinning machine. We will explain the latter 
case. A frequent cause of unevenness was a lean of 
the rollers through which yarn was drawn. If a 
worker could guess, albeit without full accuracy, 
that the cause might lie in the rollers, and proceed 
to report this to her supervisor, then the 
maintenance workers could repair it without delay, 
and the production of defective yarn would diminish. 
Circumstantial evidence supports the above 
occurrences. Several Kanebō and Fujibō factories 
reportedly set up off-the-job training courses, 
including for female workers, to instruct them on 
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how to find the cause of yarn cuts, and how to guess 
the troublesome spot in the spinning machine 
(Kuwabara [1996], Kaneko [2009]).  
The hypothesis that blue-collar workers who 
have been on the line for three or more years have 
sufficient experience to deal with some production 
problems was originally deduced from field studies 
on the final assembly line work of car manufacturing. 
At a glance, the work done in car manufacturing is 
seemingly simple and involves repetitive operations 
that require little skill. In fact, small-scale problems 
occur far more frequently than usually imagined, 
and how skillfully they are handled significantly 
affects productivity (Koike, Chuma, Ota [2001], or 
earlier Koike [1977], and Koike and Inoki [1987], 
Koike and Inoki [1990]). The same hypothesis can 
be, at least partly, examined for the case of cotton 
spinning operations in the early 20th century. To 
state it in a general framework, problems often arise 
at particular times and places and require local and 
specific knowledge of a sort pointed out by Frank 
Knight [1921, 71] and Friedrich Hayek 
[1937],[1945]. Since some of them occur more 
frequently than usually thought, the worker’s skill 
in dealing with them substantially affects production 
efficiency on the shop floor.
As for yarn cuts, one specific factor was 
particularly crucial for Japan at that time. The 
content mixture of raw cottons changed often, and 
this significantly affected the frequency of yarn cuts. 
The Japanese cotton spinning industry commonly 
mixed raw cottons imported from different parts of 
the world in search of the lowest price. This surely 
made the operations of spinners more demanding, 
since yarn cuts occur more frequently when raw 
materials change. 
A similar line of reasoning can be applied to 
climate. Low humidity gave rise to more frequent 
yarn cuts. If workers on the production line paid due 
attention to which part of the machine might cause 
trouble, it would be of great assistance to the 
maintenance workers. This is likely the reason that 
climate as well as troubles with the spinning machine 
was taken into account in calculating the aggregate 
amount of group payment. This we put forward as 
merely a hypothesis, given the lack of direct, 
decisive evidence. Yet we can say that circumstantial 
evidence points to large differentials in productivity 
by individual operators on the same type of machine.
2.4. The Grounds for Pay-for-Job Grade with 
Performance Evaluation
When considering workers’ skills, as 
described above, incentives could not be based 
solely on the piecework output of individual workers. 
It was feasible to identify individual output for only 
some of the workers. Half of the operatives in the 
final spinning department were called ‘piecers’ and 
their individual outputs could roughly be measured. 
One indicator was the span of control in handling 
the spinning machines, and was measured as a) half 
of one spinning machine, b) one spinning machine as 
a whole, c) one and half machines, and so on. This 
reflected the number of spindles operated, since 
one spinning machine usually had a certain number 
of spindles, say 144. The other indicator employed 
actual production of yarn by each individual.
Yet, other variables had to be considered as 
well. Firstly, half of the workers in the department, 
those in charge of doffing or bobbin collecting, were 
encouraged to help the piecers when they had time. 
Thus, some teamwork existed. Veteran workers 
instructed less experienced workers, which was 
crucial for elevating productivity in the long run. 
Secondly, and more important, skills in handling 
problems could not be measured simply by output, 
because unevenness in yarn caused by trouble with 
the rollers, for example, was not well identified by 
straight production or other figures. Considering 
these realities, we could say that performance 
evaluation taking into account of not necessarily 
objective factors was an appropriate way to assess 
individual skill level, although there was no 
guarantee that the evaluation would precisely 
reflect the individual’s skills. 
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Taking female workers in cotton spinning as a 
whole, a considerable group, 30-40%, were paid on 
an hourly basis of an individual base pay without 
group payment by results. Considering a large 
increase in base pay, this is clearly a pay-for-job 
grade plan, and yet this gives no indication that a 
pay-for-job grade was established at the beginning 
of the 20th century. Although rules stipulating a 
pay-for-job grade plan did exist, the presence of 
rules does not prove full implementation. 
Fortunately, Kanebō, one of the big three cotton 
spinning firms, left records of the number of female 
workers by the level of base pay for the years 1890 
and 1897. Table 3 indicates its percentage 
distribution. 
The above table clearly shows that regular 
increments in base pay had not diffused in the 
1890s. In 1890, 70% of female workers were 
concentrated at the base pay level of 8-10 sen, 
while fewer than 17% were paid higher in the range 
of 11-20 sen. In 1897, concentration became less 
distinct and the distribution looks more consistent 
with regular increments; 73% concentration could be 
found in a broader range of 11-15 sen. Yet those 
who were paid even higher remained a minority. Full 
diffusion of regular increments in base pay among 
blue-collar workers had to wait until later, roughly 
until the 1920s.
To investigate the actual situation in applying 
regular increments in base pay we need more in-
depth data disclosing the extent of actual 
implementation of such rules. So far as we have 
searched, only one case presents a detailed 
breakdown of the percentage of blue-collar workers 
whose base pay actually increased in a year: an 
aircraft manufacturer left records for each of 49 
occupations for the years 1923-24 (Tsuji [1956] p. 
875). These records suggest that most blue-collar 
workers received regular increments. For males, 
70-90% of workers had regular increments, whose 
variation ranged from 4 to 12 sen. Diffusion of the 
practice was also remarkable for female blue-collar 
workers at 75%, with variation in increments ranging 
from 2 sen to 5 sen. Naturally, it would be dangerous 
to draw strong conclusions on the basis of a single 
case. Yet, considering this case in conjunction with 
high quality studies on the regular increments in 
base pay, although they lack in-depth data of the 
kind shown above (Hyōdō [1971], Odka [1984]), it 
would be safe to say that regular increments in base 
pay among regular blue-collar workers in large 
firms―mostly yearly or with a certain interval―had 
become broadly diffused in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Notably, the implementation of regular increments 
in base pay for blue-collar workers occurred far 
earlier than in the West.
The implications are twofold. First, skills 
development for blue-collar jobs was implemented 
earlier than usually thought, and secondly, some 
demanding tasks, such as problem solving, were 
delegated not just to maintenance workers, but also 
to a part of regular blue-collar workers on the 
production lines in Japan. If this holds true, some 
elements of high performance work system already 
existed in prewar Japan. This premise will be 
strengthened in the following section using the case 
of a trade union.   
Table 3  Percentage Distribution of Female Workers by
 Base Pay-Kanebō, 1890, 1897
 (%)
Level of Base Pay (sen) 1890 1897
1-5 0.1
6-7 13.4
8-10 69.9 1.6
11-12 7.1 33.7
13-14 3.1 39
15-17 5.4 9.6
18-20 0.9 10.5
21-25 4.5
26-30 0.9
Total 100 100
Source: Rōdō Undō Shiryō Iinkai.1962.1:267-9.
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3. Union Voice in Promoting Productivity 
3.1 Collective Bargaining
To introduce the rope manufacturing trade 
union, we start by explaining how it came into 
existence in 1926, as people tend to think that 
trade unions in pre-WWII Japan were highly 
exceptional. Trade unions appeared at the end of 
the 19th century, covering such workers as turners, 
printers, and locomotive engineers. Most unions 
soon disappeared, however, mainly because they 
could not succeed in establishing solid union 
finances, due to organizational problems such as lax 
administration. It is Sōdōmei that succeeded in 
creating lasting organizations, mostly led by 
Christians. A few years later, a socialist revolution 
produced Soviet Russia, which strongly encouraged 
the development of the Japanese labor movement. 
Unions in the rope and cable industry were not 
isolated exceptions.  
The trade union analyzed here organized all 
blue-collar workers of a large firm, Tokyo Seikō 
(Tokyo Rope Manufacturing Co.). A manufacturer 
of ropes and cables for warships and civilian ships, 
and for industrial uses such as coal mining and 
electrical power plants, Tokyo Seikō employed 
about 2,000 workers. In two out of its three 
factories, trade unions appeared, though both 
covered only a small minority of workers; one 
belonged to a national center of leftist unions and 
the other to Sōdōmei or non-left wing unions. Faced 
with this situation, the management of Tokyo Seikō 
decided to accept Sōdōmei to organize all blue-
collar workers, so as to prevent the union from 
being dominated by left wing influences. This was 
the birth of Seikō Trade Union.
The first labor agreement in 1926, proposed 
and written by the leader of Sōdōmei, Matsuoka 
Komakichi, had only five articles. After stipulating 
the recognition of a closed union shop (Article 1), 
collective bargaining (Article 2), paying due 
attention to the standard of working conditions in 
the industry (Article 3), and controlling troublesome 
union members by the union (Article 4), Article 5 
reads as follows: “The company shall treat its 
employees as favorably as possible, while the union 
shall make efforts to promote the efficiency of 
work.” (Seikō Rōdō Kumiai [1936] p.56, Tokyo 
Seikō [1957] p.86)
This article 5 was not a mere paper plan. 
Surviving records demonstrate that the union 
repeatedly proposed concrete measures in annual 
collective bargaining from 1928 to 1939 except for a 
couple of years when the great depression led to 
tough layoffs. For example, the union proposed to 
establish a commendation plan for those who 
improved machinery or methods of production. 
Moreover, the union repeatedly asked management 
to hear and adopt the union’s opinion in selecting 
equipment and machinery. Not only did the union 
present proposals at collective bargaining, but it 
also put many of its own ideas in practice, such as 
creating union committees to study how to improve 
productivity (Koike [2012] pp. 237-241). Similarly, 
in the first collective bargaining at the enterprise 
level in 1928 (before that, negotiations were 
conducted mostly at the plant level), the union 
proposed to let veteran union members transfer to 
other factories, even for a short while, in order to 
exchange their knowhow and to develop their skills. 
Unfortunately, this plan was not accepted by 
hesitant management, as the transfer of blue-collar 
workers to other factories was rare at the time. 
The union’s willingness to contribute to 
improving productivity, however, never implied that 
industrial relations lacked any conflict. The great 
depression beginning in 1929 induced the 
management to conduct large-scale layoffs. The 
union negotiated tenaciously to decrease the 
number of workers to be laid off, from 160 to 109, 
and to obtain for laid-off workers an additional 
severance payment of six month wages, in addition 
to what had been stipulated as redundancy payment. 
This was far larger than common standards at the 
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time, so that 188 workers applied finally for 
voluntary separation, even more than the numbers 
first proposed by management (Seikō Rōdō Kumiai 
[1936], Koike [2012] p. 218).
3.2. Examples of Promoting Productivity
Vivid description of worker activities to 
promote productivity can be found in the record of 
a round-table talk as a part of Ten Year History of 
the Union (Seikō Rōdō Kumiai [1936]). For three 
days, nearly 30 union members discussed various 
issues that had arisen in the union’s history. Of 40 
pages printed in small type, four pages were 
allocated to describing vivid examples of promoting 
productivity. Let me introduce some of them.
Example 1 was told by a participant from 
Kokura Factory. A union member named Morioka 
contributed greatly to inventing a way to save a 
great deal of labor in stretching cables. For 
stretching cables, it was necessary to reheat the 
cables several times, followed by additional 
processes such as acid washing. Morioka made 
efforts to improve the method to stretch the cables 
a few times while reheating only once, though no 
detailed explanation about how Morioka did it is 
provided (Seikō Rōdō Kumiai [1936] p. 248).2)
Example 2 was told by a participant from 
Kawasaki Factory. That was a change in the system 
from “one machine operated by one worker” to 
”two machines by one worker”. The speaker 
emphasized that the major driving force behind this 
change was not new machines, but workers’ idea 
due to their study of work (Seikō Rōdō Kumiai 
[1936] p. 247).
Example 3 was told by another participant 
from a different department of Kawasaki Factory. 
He mentioned figures illustrating how much 
productivity had improved. Around 1927 or 28, 
roughly 20 thousand pounds of output were 
produced by 76 female and 7 male workers. Eight or 
nine years later, their study and effort made it 
possible to produce almost an equivalent output 
with fewer people―51 female and 9 male workers. 
This indicates an increase in productivity of nearly 
40%. Clearly, workers contributed to this 
improvement in productivity (Seikō Rōdō Kumiai 
[1936] p. 247).
Example 4 was told by a participant from 
Hyōgo Factory. Ten years ago, he said, 280 workers 
produced about 12,000-13,000 pounds of rope and 
cable. Ten years later, little more than half the 
workers produced 17,000-18,000 pounds per day. 
Although this was partly due to installation of more 
efficient machines and equipment, he said, no one 
could deny workers’ contribution. Workers 
proposed better machinery and the atmosphere on 
the shop floor had changed for workers to handle 
work so earnestly (Seikō Rōdō Kumiai [1936] p. 
248).
The change in atmosphere was also emphasized 
by a participant from Kawasaki Factory. In the 
initial period when the union started to improve 
productivity, many union members criticized those 
who promoted improved methods as entering into a 
conspiracy with management; some even called 
them company spies (Seikō Rōdō Kumiai [1936] p. 
246). Yet, year-by-year, those who were against 
promoting productivity shrank in number. Another 
anecdote describing the atmosphere on the shop 
floor before the union started supports this. A 
worker reported that bloody brawls used to break 
out almost every day, but after the union came in 
violent conflicts disappeared (Seikō Rōdō Kumiai 
[1936] pp. 239-240).   
3.3 Union Voice
Here, one simple question may be raised: why 
did trade union members eagerly promote 
productivity? This is a natural question, considering 
ordinary perceptions of trade unionism at the time, 
according to which cooperative behavior was 
nothing other than abandoning the duty of unions to 
oppose management. A first step to answer to this 
question is to identify which workers were most 
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eager to promote productivity. 
Existing evidence suggests that the workers 
most enthusiastic about promoting productivity on 
the shop floor were active in union activities. 
Participants in the round-table talk were mostly 
union committeemen or union delegates. Another 
question naturally follows: why were union activists 
able to persuade their fellow union members to take 
an active attitude toward improving productivity? In 
answering this question, we have to discuss two 
implications of crucial importance. One is a doubt 
against a common theory of skill specificity and the 
other is the importance of union voice. Let me begin 
with the former.
Needless to say, the central mission of trade 
unionism is to protect employment even in severe 
competition in the market. Tokyo Seikō was not a 
monopolist, but faced several competitors. Without 
improving productivity, workers would be exposed 
to the danger of being laid off. According to ordinary 
economics, the willingness of workers to cooperate 
to raise productivity could usually be explained by 
a. enterprise-specific skills, or b. job security, both 
of which would have been thought especially 
important in Japan. 
To begin with the first point, this explanation, 
however, overlooks a visible feature of market 
economies. If a worker without any specific skills is 
laid off from a company, he or she would find it 
difficult to gain a similar job in the same industry 
within a short time. The reason is plain. In a tough 
situation in which a company has to conduct layoffs, 
it is natural that other companies in the same 
industry also suffer. Even if they do not dare to 
conduct layoffs, few would recruit more employees. 
Thus, laid-off workers would be compelled to find 
different jobs in other industries, for which they 
could hardly utilize their skills. 
As for the latter point that emphasizes job 
security, it is questionable for a firm to secure jobs 
perfectly in tough competition of the market. Less 
efficient firms have no way other than fading away 
from markets. To prevent from this destiny, firms 
are compelled to decrease production so as to lay 
off a part of workers: if not, all employees may lose 
jobs. Therefore, the essence of the issue of job 
security is a choice which part of the workers are 
burdened to be laid off; less senior workers as the 
US blue collar or more senior workers in 
contemporary Japan. The announcement of job 
security by the firm cannot be any guarantee of 
employment. Consequently,  it is reasonable for 
union members to follow their leaders in promoting 
productivity, so far as market competition prevails.
A short look at other trade unions in those 
days is helpful in showing that the cooperative 
approach of the rope and cable union was not a rare 
exception. Consulting Rōdō (Labor), the monthly 
journal issued by Sōdōmei, we can find occasional, 
though not numerous, reports of trade unions whose 
members were eager to promote productivity (Koike 
[2012] pp. 242-244). This was an essential part of 
the union policy of Sōdōmei, realizing that this 
activity was crucial for maintaining employment 
under tough market competition. 
The above story, however, should not be 
misinterpreted to imply that Sōdōmei was so 
submissive and compliant that it rarely went on 
strike. The frequency of strikes was actually greater 
than the average for all unions, and according to 
government statistics the duration of strikes by 
Sōdōmei was longer than that of other unions. In 
fact, the longest and largest strike in pre-war Japan 
was conducted by Noda Shōyu Rōdō Kumiai (Noda 
Soy Source Union) under the leadership of Sōdōmei’s 
Matsuoka Komakichi (Matsuoka [1928], Koike 
[2012] Chap.12). In other words, without effective 
union voice, how could workers expect to see 
returns for presenting their own ideas, and if they 
could not anticipate securing adequate returns, why 
they present their ideas?
Incentive systems for workers in the Seikō 
union likely shared (though available data are still 
insufficient to determine with certainty) common 
features with other large corporations in Japan at 
that date. These consisted of base pay and some 
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group payment by results. The former increased in 
yearly increments in accordance with performance 
evaluation. The latter, as most companies, had a 
kind of group payment depending on group outputs, 
though the weight of the two is unclear. These 
features largely coincided with the findings in the 
frequently cited studies of high quality as Hyodo 
[1971] and Odaka [1984]. 
In short, we can surmise that an initial stage 
of worker collaboration with management to improve 
productivity started as early as the 1920s, which is 
much earlier than has usually been thought (Kato 
and Morishima [2002], Shimazaki, Mori, and 
Umeshaki [2012]). 
4. Implications and Discussion
We title the final section“Implications and 
Discussion” rather than the conventional 
“Conclusions” to emphasize our intention to discuss 
some conjectures as well as implications that are 
crucial to understanding how contemporary high 
performance work systems operate on the shop floor.
Implication 1 : The collaborative type of 
industrial relations in contemporary Japan has a root 
that could be observed at least as early as the 1920s. 
This suggests that the observed willingness of 
Japanese workers to collaborate with management to 
promote productivity has a firmer earlier foundation 
in terms of workers skill development than ordinarily 
thought. This raises a further question: why did Japan 
develop so early the foundations of high performance 
work systems? My conjecture is a kind of latecomer 
theory. World industrialization has roughly two 
stages. Each developed specific work systems, such 
as craft unionism in the first stage and industrial 
unionism based on workplace organizations in the 
second stage. As a latecomer, Japan started her 
industrialization in the late 19th century, which was 
almost the end of the first stage. For Japan, there 
was not enough time to establish the features of the 
work systems of the first stage. This implies that the 
cost to throw off the work systems of the first stage 
was small. Consequently, she could easily move to 
the second stage and to acquire its features. 
Contrarily, earlier starters in the first stage needed 
a longer time to change the whole systems fit to the 
second stage. This would be a possible answer why 
high performance work systems developed early in 
Japan (Koike [1988] pp. 281-284).
The majority opinion in Japan kave long 
insisted that Japanese industrial society has lagged 
behind that of the West, and that workers were 
easily induced to acquiesce meekly to management 
prerogatives ( Ōkōchi [1980]). Seeming collaboration, 
the argument goes, was nothing other than workers 
following management directives owing to weak 
union voice. Many important facts can hardly be 
explained by this interpretation, however. To 
mention one of them, why would workers who were 
wise enough to devise efficient work methods allow 
themselves to be easily trapped by management? 
Implementation 2 : These case studies provide 
support for a hypothesis of ‘white-collarization’. 
The concept of white-collarization was originated by 
Koike to explain Japanese features in industrial 
relations.3) This hypothesis insists that a considerable 
part of the Japanese blue-collar workers have shared 
similarity to some extent with the white-collar 
workers in the West both in age-wage profiles and 
in their skills. This can explain a large increase in 
base pay with yearly increments under performance 
evaluation of blue-collar workers, the major feature 
of incentives in the 1920s and 1930s. The evidence 
given earlier shows that even for female blue-collar 
workers around the beginning of the 20th century, 
base pay for experienced workers increased to 
almost twice the starting rate. The system was in its 
infancy in those days, however, since in practice the 
wages of many workers concentrated around a 
narrow band of base pay. By the 1920s and 1930s, 
this system had been applied to most blue-collar 
workers in large firms in Japan.  
This feature has long been accounted for in a 
different way that is full of misunderstanding by 
almost all sides including management, labor and 
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academy. Under “seniority wages,” many analysts 
believe (Abgglen [1969]) that base pay is largely 
determined by seniority, and lacks effective 
incentives. Yet, this majority opinion has neglected 
the true feature: regular increments in base pay that 
vary in accordance with performance evaluation 
have been applied even to blue-collar workers, both 
in prewar and post war Japan. Moreover, contrary 
to the common perception in Japan, since the 1920s 
and 1930s Japanese white-collar and blue-collar 
workers have shared with European and American 
white-collar workers two crucial features: base pay 
plans with a large increase in pay profiles (in the 
case of prewar Japanese cotton spinners eventually 
amounting to nearly twice base pay), and yearly 
increments under performance evaluation. These 
could be called white-collarization of blue collar 
workers.
Implication 3 : The third implication concerns 
the ability of workers to deal with problems and 
changes--the knowhow to identify defects in 
product quality or to reason the causes of the 
defects and of trouble in equipment. This is a 
conjecture that is not directly derived from the 
analysis in this paper, but is discussed as a remaining 
task. 
At their highest level, these skills enable 
workers to participate in the implementation of 
changes in production lines or even to have a say in 
the design of the new model. Unfortunately, it has 
been possible to touch only briefly upon this topic 
here. Nonetheless, there are two reasons to dare to 
discuss production-related problem-solving here. 
One is that a certain character of workers’ skills is, 
in my opinion, a vital factor for high performance 
work systems. Few papers, however, seem to deal 
with this factor in depth. Usually off-the-job training 
courses for skill development or job rotation systems 
are referred to, but the very core of the character 
of skills has not yet been analyzed: participation in 
designing a new production line, and a voice in the 
design of new products. 
Incentives for individual skill development are 
crucial. They may take a form of pay-for-job grade 
with performance evaluation to encourage individual 
skill development. Without elucidating the character 
and content of these worker skills as well as 
incentive systems to encourage them, we can hardly 
clarify the major way to promote productivity.
*  This is largely a digested English version of Koike 
[2013], highlighting its essential parts. It is 
grateful for helpful comments from Profs, Takenori 
Inoki, Susumu Hagiwara, Yoshio Okunishi, Hiroshi 
Kumon, Chieko Kanbayashi, Ryoji Kaneko, and 
Hideo Owan. This work was supported by the 
grant of Nihon Keizai Kenkyu Center (Kenkyu 
Shoreikin N.2012-02).
Notes:
1)  For preventing possible misunderstandings, it would 
be in order to explain the key word in this paper, “pay-
for-job grade” plans:
a. Here, a job grade, or a pay grade, is “one of the 
classes, levels, or groups into which jobs of the same 
or similar values are grouped into for compensation 
purposes. All jobs in a pay grade have the same pay 
range-maximum, minimum, and midpoint.” (Milkovich 
and Newman [2005] pp.608,611). Thus, pay-for-job 
grade plans are different from “pay-for-job” plans with 
a single rate or a small range for a job, but have 
relatively a large range for each grade; the maximum is 
usually higher than the minimum by 50-60%.
b. Base pay of the pay-for-job grade plans has normally 
yearly increments within the range, subject to 
performance appraisal whose measures are not 
necessarily objective, so as to assess non-quantitative 
factors, and neighboring ranges commonly overlap to 
some extent.
c. The number of job grades are ordinarily 10-15 for 
exempted white collar workers.
d. In my understanding, pay-for-job grade plans are 
broadly applied for white collar workers in the Western 
Europe and the US.
   Other technical wording concerning pay follows mostly 
those of Milkovich and Newman [2005].
2) Morioka surely was a blue-collar worker because his 
name was listed as one of the representatives of the 
workers side, when his union was converted by the 
government to a branch of Sangyō Hōkokukai  (Industry 
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Joint Organization Serving to the Sate), following the 
creation of Arbeitsfront (Labor-Front) in Germany 
(Tokyo Seikō [1957] p.112).
3) This hypothesis of white collarization was first 
presented in Japanese (Koike [1981]), and later in 
English as a paper (Koike [1983]) and a book (Koike 
[1988]). This Hypothesis is a product of European-
Japan comparison utilizing two monumental statistics 
surveys: For the (then) European Community (EC), 
Structure of Earnings in Industry, for the year 1972, 
and in the case of Japan, Ministry of Labor, Japan, 
”Chingin Kōzō Kihon Tōkei Chōsa (Basic Statistics of 
Wage Structure)”, yearly. Originally, the hypothesis 
was deduced from the similarity of age-wage profiles 
and length of service between white-collar workers in 
both the West and Japan, and blue-collar workers in 
large firms in Japan. Hence, it predicts smaller 
difference in wage patterns between blue-collar and 
white-collar workers in Japan. Later, the concept was 
extended to the character of skills in dealing with novel 
problems, and even other areas. Although Koike 
[1988] discusses this hypothesis at length, extended 
analysis is developed in Koike [2012] in Japanese.
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